







































Heterogeneity Happens: How Rights Matter in Economic Development 
 
Johannes Fedderke, Penn State University, University of Witwatersrand, ERSA 
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The paper examines how much governance matters for long run economic development in poor 
countries. 
 
Answering this question confronts four methodological challenges. First, since growth 
equations are likely to be underspecified, unobserved effects are likely to render standard 
estimators biased and inconsistent. Second, measurement error, time‐varying unobserved 
effects, and possible feedback from growth into governance will violate the exogeneity 
assumptions of many estimators. Bias and inconsistency is again the consequence. Third, use 
of cross‐country evidence opens the possibility that the interaction between governance and 
growth shows considerable country‐specificity. In the presence of heterogeneity, estimation 
under a specification that imposes homogeneity on the governance – growth link, will again 
result in bias and inconsistency. Finally, an assumption of linearity in the growth‐governance 
relationship across large ranges of per capita income and differences in institutional structure is 
at least questionable. The paper addresses these problems by contrasting results obtained under 
pooled OLS, fixed effects, GMM, country specific time series and PMG estimators. Results 
confirm that all four methodological concerns are valid. Taking account of the problems 
renders estimates of the impact of governance more robust, and serves to increase its impact. 
 
Our best estimate of the impact of improving rights on the level of real per capita output is that 
this differs between countries with good, mid‐range and poor rights. The implied elasticities of 
a benevolent impact on the level of real per  capita output of improving rights ranging from 
0.28 to 0.22 for countries with the worst rights, and 0.07‐0.02 for countries with the best rights. 
Countries with midrange rights have a perverse association between improving rights and 
output, though the estimated elasticity range is relatively weak over the 0.03‐0.02 range. 
Improving rights have an indirect impact on output as well a direct one. Improving rights serve 
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1 It is also arguably as old as economics itself. Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) played close 
attention to the impact of economic institutions on development; David Landes’ The Wealth and Poverty of 
Nations (1998) does likewise. The modern resurgence of interest in institutions and their impact on 
development is significantly due to the contributions of North (1980, 1990) and North and Thomas (1970, 
1973). For a detailed examination of the argument in Landes (1998) see Fedderke (1999). For a review of 
the literature in the first half of the 1990’s, see Fedderke (1997). Acemoglu et al (2004) present an attempt 
at both theoretical and empirical investigations into why governance might differ across time and space. 
2 The following 16 indicators (with sources) were, “chosen because of the relative quality and objectivity of 
their data, country coverage, public availability, and correlation with growth and poverty reduction, will be 
used to assess national performance relative to governing justly, investing in people, and encouraging 
economic freedom”:  
1.  Governing Justly:  Civil Liberties (Freedom House); Political Rights (Freedom House); Voice and 
Accountability (World Bank Institute); Government Effectiveness (World Bank Institute); Rule of 
Law (World Bank Institute); Control of Corruption (World Bank Institute). 
2.  Investing in People:  Public Primary Education Spending as Percent of GDP (World Bank/national 
sources); Primary Education Completion Rate (World Bank/national sources); Public Expenditures 
on Health as Percent of GDP (World Bank/national sources); Immunization Rates: DPT and 
Measles (World Bank/UN/national sources).  
3.  Promoting Economic Freedom:  Country Credit Rating (Institutional Investor Magazine);  
Inflation (IMF); 3-Year Budget Deficit (IMF/national sources); Trade Policy (Heritage 
Foundation); Regulatory Quality (World Bank Institute); Days to Start a Business (World Bank). 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations/millennium.html 
3 Exceptions will be allowed by recommendation of the MCA Board of Directors to the President.  Once 
chosen, recipient countries will sign three-year contracts with the United States, and the effectiveness of 
their efforts will be judged by the results. 




























Often a society has at least four definitions of a bribe—that of the more advanced 
moralists; that of the law as written; that of the law as in any degree enforced; that 
of common practice.  If one is to say that an act of bribery has been committed, 






                                                 
5 This is a lesson drawn by Dollar and Pritchett (1998) — and see also Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
6 For instance, USAID states that: “Only if governance becomes more democratic and accountable will 
development occur in the poorly performing countries. And only with a comprehensive, consistent, ‘tough 
love’ from the international community is political will for governance reform likely to emerge and be 






































































                                                 
7 The Freedom House political rights variable assesses to what extent the political system offers voters the 
opportunity to choose freely from among candidates and to what extent the candidates are chosen 
independently of the state. Formal electoral procedures are not the only factors that determine the real 
distribution of power. In many countries, the military retains a significant political role, while in others, the 
king maintains considerable power over the elected politicians. Civil liberties measures the extent to which 
counties maintain a set of basic rights for their citizens, including freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, education, religion, and are governed by an established and generally equitable system of rule 
of law. The measure does not equate constitutional guarantees of human rights with the on-the-ground 
fulfillment of these rights. 
8 To cite but one example, Easterly et al. (2004) question the robustness of the Dollar and Pritchett (1998) 




































                                                 
9 By contrast, the Kaufman et al (1999a, 2002) measures cover only about half a decade at best.  
10 Skepticism such as that of Geertz (1983) concerning the feasibility of measuring the full diversity, locally 
specific, and protean aspects of “governance” would seem to emphasize the importance of measuring as 
many different aspects of governance as possible. Desirability is easy to concede. Necessity does not follow 

































                                                 
11 In the microeconometric literature this estimation issue has been addressed for some time –for instance in 
isolating so-called average treatment effects. Health outcomes may depend on the level and quality of 
medical care – but both the impact of the medical care and the health outcome may also depend on some 
unobservable (genetic, say) characteristics of patients. 
12 Bollen (1991) and Inkeles (1991) provide detailed reflections on these questions from the perspective of 
political scientists. Fedderke, et al (2001a) provides a further detailed discussion of issues arising from the 
measurement of dimensions of governance in the context of long time series evidence. 
13 For a theoretical model examining possible mechanisms for the reverse causality, see Gradstein (2004). 
14 For an application to South African growth, using time series evidence, see Fedderke et al (2001b). For a 































                                                 
15 Though the correlation between measures of instability and governance is not always strong.  
16 The point for Rodrick is that the general prescription that incentives matter, that good governance 
matters, leaves considerable scope for particular solutions as to how this might be attained in any instance. 
17 The oft cited examples in the literature from East Asia. Rodrick’s (2003) point is that they adhered to the 
important general principles (security of property rights, properly aligned incentives), while finding 
particular solutions appropriate to their history and cultural patterns. 
18 Read here particularly Latin America, which adopted policies to emerge from the Washington Consensus 
(first and second generation), but without much improvement in growth. 
19 Fedderke (2001) in considering time series evidence on a country-by-country basis, demonstrated that the 
structure of the link between governance and economic performance differs between countries, while the 






































                                                 






































                                                 
21 Note that in the discussion we will employ the terms “governance” and “rights” interchangeably.   12
The most immediate concern of any specification such as (2.1) is that the true 
specification is in fact: 





























                                                 
22 For a general discussion of the issues raised in this subsection, see Wooldrigde (2002: ch’s10, 11 and 15). 
23 Cross sectional data would require the use of proxies for C in direct estimation of (2.1’), or recourse to 
some instrumental variables approach – presuming appropriate instruments are available. 
24 An alternative to RE would be to use pooled OLS (POLS), provided that the introduction of serial 
correlation due to the presence of the omitted variable in the error term is corrected for through the use of 
robust variance matrix estimator, and robust standard errors. Indeed, the presence of serial correlation in 
errors is one proposed means of testing for the presence of unobserved effects. 
25 See for instance Barro (1991) on political instability, and on colonial background see Véliz (1994), 
North, Summerhill and Weingast (2000) and Wiarda (2001). See also the discussion in Acemoglu et al 






























                                                 
26 Note that the FE assumption of time invariant unobserved effects excludes the possibility of employing 
time-invariant regressors in estimation. One generalization which relaxes the assumption of time invariant 
unobserved effects is given by random trend models, in which each group in the panel has an individual-
specific trend in addition to its specific unobserved effect. Consistent estimation can then proceed by means 
of fixed effects on second differences, as long as the exogeneity assumption is satisfied, since the first 
difference eliminates the time invariant unobserved effect, the second difference the individual time trend. 
See Heckman and Hotz (1989). 
27 We restrict ourselves to the within estimator, since the between estimator loses the time variation within 
each cross section. Note that efficiency would also impose the requirement of homoscedastic variance and 
an absence of serial correlation. Serial correlation may be a concern particularly where the time dimension 
is large, and requires a robust asymptotic variance estimator – see for instance Arellano (1987). 
28 Which eliminates the time-invariant unobserved effect. 






























                                                 
30 Practical considerations may preclude this option. Large numbers of instruments can render estimation 
not only difficult (due to the column dimension of instruments), but large numbers of overidentifying 
restrictions have poor finite sample properties – see for instance Tauchen (1986), Altonji and Segal (1996), 
and Ziliak (1997). Note also that under an AR(1) structure where the autocorrelation coefficient approaches 
unity, the proposed instruments tend to be weak – though Blundell and Bond (1998) propose a solution, 
based on starting estimation from a steady state solution.  
31 An example of an application here is Levine, Gustafson and Velenchik (1997), in examining the effect of 
smoking on wages. An omitted variable is income, which depends on the wage, but may also have an 
income effect on cigarette consumption. 
32 See the analysis in Levitt (1996) of prison population on crime rates. 
33 Classically by Lipset (1959), but see also the discussion in Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998). 
34 See for instance the discussion in Bollen (1991) and Inkeles (1991). Klitgaard and Fedderke (1995) 































  () , it it it it RR K Zη =+   (2.2) 
                                                 
35 It might appear as if an appropriate alternative would be to employ the exogenous variables of the 
structural relationship. Unfortunately this is unlikely to suffice, since their exogeneity is likely to render 
their correlation with the first difference of the variables being instrumented for low, so that they provide 
poor instruments. 
36 See the full discussion in Wooldridge (2002:311f) on these points. 
37 See for instance Angrist and Imbens (1995), Heckman (1997), and Heckman and Vytlacil (1998). 
Wooldridge (2002:638f) serves as overview. For the binary case, Persson and Tabellini (2004) provides an 
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Robertson and Symons (1992) demonstrate that under OLS, plim ˆ λ >λ, plim ˆ β <β. 
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39 Use of the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator of dynamic models in first differencing to eliminate 
individual effects, using lagged first differences as instruments, as suggested by Arellano (1989) for 
stationary data, does not offer a solution. Instruments are invalid under false homogeneity restrictions on 
the βi, unless Kit is white noise or follows a random walk.  The second alternative is the economically most 
relevant, and for this Robertson and Symons demonstrate that if Kit is a random walk, the instrument is 
rendered orthogonal to the instrumented variable, and the estimator has infinite asymptotic variance. 
Finally, severe biases occur where Kit is stationary and autocorrelated. 
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by pooling and denoted  . , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ 2
DFE jDFE jDFE DFE DFE andσ δ λ β φ  The estimate of the long‐
run coefficient is obtained by  ( ). ˆ / ˆ ˆ








































= = ∑ , where  ˆˆ ˆ ,, i i ij ij and φ βλ δare the OLS estimates obtained individually 













homogeneous,  . , , 2 , 1 , N i i K = =θ θ  The common long‐run coefficients and the 
group‐specific short‐run coefficients are computed by pooled maximum 
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41 The DFE is readily represented as under the PMGE (Figure 4), but with identical dynamics around the 
long run equilibrium relationship across the two groups. 






















() KK R =   (2.10) 
such that: 







                                                 
43 The context here is the theory of investment under uncertainty given irreversibility due to Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994). 
44 Indeed argument has been presented in either direction. For instance, autocratic regimes have been 
argued to represent high degrees of discretionary power on the part of policy makers, rendering the 
expected rate of return uncertain for investors – see for instance Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1995). As an 
alternative, democratic regimes may be subject to high levels of populist pressure, rendering policy 
consistency uncertain, while autocratic regimes if stable may provide both the high savings rates and the 
stability of policy direction conducive to long run accumulation – see the discussion in Barro (1994). 
45 See for instance Fielding (1997, 2000) and Fedderke (2004) on investment in physical capital stock for 
manufacturing, Fedderke and Liu (2002) on capital flows, and Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001b) on 
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Again the impact of any change in governance will be both direct and indirect – 
direct through YRdR, indirect by changing the impact any investment has on 






























































                                                 
46 For a few countries one or two year’s observations at the start of the T dimension are missing. 




The  increase  in  spread  is  driven  by  a  few  rightward  outliers  –  noticeably 
Singapore, where RGDP rises from $7K to $28K over the time period studied.  
The growth variable (one‐year change in log‐transformed per capita GDP) has a 

















worst  rights  on  average  occurring  in  the  Middle  East  &  North  Africa,  Sub‐
Saharan  Africa,  and  Asia,  while  South  America,  Central  America  and  the 
Caribbean  and  Oceania  on  average  show  movement  from  poor  to  mid‐level 








                                                 
48 This study has at its disposal a number of measures of governance. One question therefore is why we do 
not have recourse to factor or principal components analysis. Two sets of reasons motivate our choice. 
First, given our interest in long development, our analysis requires long time runs of data in the governance 
dimensions, and many of the governance indicators do not have this available. Secondly, given the many 
strong correlations between the rights measures for the time periods in which many indicators are present, 
suggests that the informational content gain from the principal component is not necessarily strong.    24
 





In  1972,  almost  half  the  sample  (45%)  was  POOR  and  close  to  one  third  (20 

























                                                 
49 Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Chile, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mexico, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
50 Benin, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Paraguay, Senegal, South Africa, South Korea, and 
Swaziland. 
51 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Hungary, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Portugal, Spain, and Uruguay.   
52 Algeria, Colombia, Egypt, Guyana, India, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Togo, Tunisia, and Venezuela. 
53 Burundi, China, Congo-Kinshasa, Dominican Republic, Israel, Jamaica, Mauritania, Mauritius, 


















Fluctuations  in  regional  rankings  are  usually  small,  except  for  the  growth 
variable.  Noticeably, Asia makes an advance in all variables except RIGHTS and 
FDI, and individual Asian countries have the sharpest investment and export 


























Governance  is  associated  with  output  to  a  higher  extent  as  countries  move 
away (in either direction) from the middle of the governance scale.  We next 
examined  the  impact  of  underlying  governance  on  the  relationship  between 
RIGHTS and income, using both rolling categories (i.e., RIGHTS from 2 to 4, 
from 3 to 5, and so on) and the three major governance classifications above.  







at  other  variables,  the  low  but  positive  correlations  between  growth  and  the 
education variables increase slightly (by about +0.2) as the rights category gets 
worse.  Finally,  the  correlation  between  LNRGDP  and  EXPORTS  increases 
significantly  (from  –0.4  to  +0.4),  again  as  we  move  to  worse  categories  of 
governance. 
 
Limiting  the  data  to  periods  of  large  and  rapid  changes  in  governance 




This  may  reflect  a  negative  shock  to  growth  associated  with  political 
liberalization.  Conversely, it may represent reverse causality – the greater the 
economic  problems  in  an  unfree  country,  the  larger  the  liberalization  that  is 
subsequently triggered.  This correlation reverses with a one‐year lag, suggesting 
that large liberalizations are associated with higher levels of next‐year growth.  
After  one  year,  there  is  no  clear  trend.  For  country‐years  with  rapid 






Volatility  of  RIGHTS  seems  to  have  some  positive  relation  with  output.  
However, the volatility of RGDP and GROWTH does not seem to be related to 































                                                 
54 Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chile, El Salvador, Guyana, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Senegal, S Africa, Zimbabwe. 
55 Argentina, Greece, Hungary, Mali, Philippines, and Uruguay. 




































                                                 
57  For example, someone may have a theory of governance that gives great weight to participation and 
democracy, but little to stability and bureaucratic efficiency.  Another may simply focus on the prevalence 
of corruption. 
58 Sachs chapter in World Economic Forum volume, Feb. 2002. It is “theoretical” in that it includes data 
that “seem to be” related to governance—or that someone else has thought it so related.  It does not include 













































































                                                 
59 World Economic Forum (2004). The correlation is from the 2001-2002 report.  
60 A reliability coefficient of 1.0 would indicate perfect agreement and no measurement error, 0 would 













































































                                                 
61 Where the latter route is adopted, note that the implicit question is then whether it is the level of 
governance that is relevant to growth (as would be implied by the production function formulation (2.1)), or 
whether it is changes in governance that drive output growth. 
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63 Estimation in Section 4.1 is by means of PCGIVE. 
64 In a third variant we repeated the two sets of specifications reported, but under a β1=0 restriction. Since 
the results do not differ materially from those reported, we do not discuss them here for the sake of 
parsimony. Full results are available from the authors. 
65 The control group is thus North America, North, West and Central Europe. 
66 The Barro-Lee data set contains data point only at 5 yearly intervals. Since changes in the human capital 
dimensions being measured over half decades are gradual for all but a small number of countries, we 
interpolated linearly.  

































                                                 
68 Note that in estimation the policy variables enter in logarithmic transform, in order to minimize the 
impact of outliers and strong right tailed distributions. 
69 Given the presence of significant autocorrelation, we report only robust standard errors – as throughout 
this study. 
70 Note, however that the difference between FE and FDOLS results gives an indication of the unsurprising 
possibility of significant simultaneity between the two rights measures. Since our concern is merely to 
establish close association between the measures here, not the establishment of the precise form of the 
association, we note with interest, but due not pursue the question further at this point. Individual country 
time series evidence below does contain further information on the association between different measures 


































                                                 
71 We explored a number of possible specifications, including ones in which investment is not subjected to 
the log transform. While providing variable elasticities none of the results reported are materially affected. 
Full results are available from the authors on request. 
72 Estimation under a constant elasticity specification returns a coefficient of 0.29, consistent with our 
variable elasticity results. 



























                                                 
74 There is some weak evidence of a concave relationship between inflation and real per capita GDP, which 
we explored in some depth. While theoretically appealing (by implying an optimal inflation rate), the result 
is unfortunately not robust to simple sensitivity tests, and we therefore abandoned the possibility. Full 
results available from the authors on request. 
75 The literature has suggested both possibilities. The declining marginal return on capital follows 
immediately from any standard Solow-Swan like growth model, though note that a number of authors have 
suggested endogenous growth models that reverse the declining returns on factors of production in the 
context of FDI flows. See for instance De Mello(1997) and Ramirez( 2000). The same authors raise the 
possibility of crowd-out, though generally empirical findings have suggested positive technology spill-
overs and an absence of crowd out. See also Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan (1994) and Borensztein, De 













⎛⎞ =+ + + + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑  
 
(4.1’) 
where the presence of a time invariant unobserved effect renders uit=εit+ci, where ci denotes the unobserved 



































                                                 
77 While we report only the specification controlling for all additional possible regressors, in all instances 
we also estimated under the full γj=0 ∀ j restrictions, as well as the partial versions discussed under the 
pooled OLS results of Table 10. Results are symmetrical to those discussed in the text, but full results are 
available from the authors.  
78 Reasons include time varying unobserved effects, measurement error, and endogeneity. 






































                                                 
80 Presuming that they do not vary due to sampling error. 
81 While we do not report the results, use of the second difference estimator of Heckman and Hotz (1989) 



























                                                 
82 Estimation in Section 4.2 is by means of PCGIVE. Again for the sake of parsimony, we report only 
results for the composite RIGHTS measure – given the consistent comparability of the results for the two 
individual and the composite rights measures. Full results remain available from authors on request. 
83 See Windmeijer (2000). 
84 Orthogonal deviations express each observation as the deviation from the average of future observations 
in the sample for the same country, and weight each deviation in order to standardize the variance. See 
Arellano and Bover (1995). 
85 This reflects both the broad consistency of the results obtained from the Orth-transform, and the 
marginally better stability of the Orth-based results. 
86 Note that we employ both levels and the standard FD GMM instruments. This is valid where lagged 
levels of the instruments are uncorrelated with the individual effects, but correlated with the dependent 
variable. The Sargan test statistic validates the choice. The Sargan test is asymptotically chi-square 
distributed, with degress of freedom given by the number of overidentifying restrictions under the null of 
valid instrumentation. The Sargan test is heteroscedasticity-consistent only under the two-step GMM 
estimator. 
87 Here too we examined evidence from more parsimonious specifications, excluding the geography, policy 
and human capital variables. No results reported above are materially affected by such exclusions. As 






































                                                 
88 Note incidentally that the British colonial heritage is by no means robustly benevolent – we readily 





































































                                                 
89 Estimation in Section 4.3 is by means of MICROFIT. Where relevant, we provide remarks on the 
sensitivity of results to consideration of the 66 country sample employed in our panel, rather than the full 
set of 162 countries. 
90 Full results are reported in Appendix 2. Note that where ADF test statistics were ambiguous, testing was 
supplemented by Phillips-Perron, autocorrelation function, and spectral density statistics. 
91 Note that some countries are classified in more than one cell of Table 8. This is because per capita 
output, investment, and the two Freedom House rights variables are all individually characterized in terms 
of stationarity, such that in both the economic and governance dimensions a country can fall into two order 
of integration.  
92 Note that here we have followed the data diagnostics strictly, and have not allowed theoretical 
































                                                                                                                                                   
country specific evidence, may override some of the diagnostics on a priori considerations, and in the light 
of special circumstances that apply to the context.  
93 There is a second sense in which heterogeneity type II is assured. As Table 4 illustrates, some countries 
fall into more than one grouping – either because the two alternative rights measures may be integrated of 
different orders, or because the output and investment variables are integrated of different orders. Again, 
the implication is that heterogeneity type II is present, but in this instance not only between, but even 
possibly within countries. 
94 The mean of RIGHTS in this group of countries is 5.45, lower than the average of 8.5 in our panel of 66 
countries. When Algeria, Burundi, Oman, Rwanda and the UAE are omitted from Group IV, the mean of 
RIGHTS falls further to 4.16. Of the Group IV countries, 12 average a Freedom House political rights score 


































                                                 
95 This would render all regressors stationary, allowing standard estimation techniques to be employed in 
principle. However, the virtually complete absence of variation in the governance dimension, precludes the 
use of standard estimators. 
96 In this sample of countries CIVLIB and POLRIGHT are closely related. A regression of POLRIGHT on 
CIVLIB returns a partial correlation coefficient of 1.07, with standard error 0.05. Use of both measures 
jointly augurs problems of multicollinearity. 
97 We also tested for the possibility that the volatility of rights might eliminate the rights –growth 






















cointegrating relationships denoted r, such that  . 1 0 − ≤ ≤ k r This gives us a k‐
dimensional VAR: 
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1 : ) r ( H αβ = Π   (4.4) 
where Π is p x p, and α, β are p x r matrices of full rank.  H1 (r) is thus the 
hypothesis of reduced rank of Π.  Where r > 1, issues of identification arise.99  
                                                                                                                                                   
However, the association between rights and growth remains statistically significant, the economic 
significance virtually unchanged, while the variability of rights has no statistical impact on mean growth. 
98 See Johansen (1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). 
99 See Wickens (1996), Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992), Pesaran and Shin (1995a, 1995b), Pesaran, 
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100 Appendix 3 provides the full results of estimation. Note that in a few instances the presence of a 
bivariate specification, or very clear indication of a single cointegrating relationship, we were able to 
estimate the relationship by means of an ARDL cointegrating framework. We indicate where this approach 
is pursued in Appendix 3. See Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) for details on the estimation framework. 






































                                                 
102 This is the case for Benin, Bhutan, Nicaragua. 
103 This is the case for Guinea Bissau, Jordan, Malaysia, Mozambique, Niger, Portugal, South Africa, 

































                                                 
104 Note that for the purposes of the regressions, as well as the subsequent discussion of this subsection, 
countries whose elasticity was estimated on a rights measure on the 1-7 scale, were rescaled to the 2-14 
scale. Note also that we exclude the two outlier cases given by Sudan and Oman, with their strong 
elasticities. 
105 An earlier indication of such a possibility was advanced by Barro (1997: ch 2), which postulated an 
inverted U-shaped relation between governance and growth in output. Barro found that countries in mid-
range levels of governance experienced the highest levels of growth in output, while both extreme 
autocracies and extreme democracies experience somewhat lower growth. Our finding is also parabolic,  




































                                                 
106 Measured as the difference between the variable elasticity computed at the highest (worst rights) level 
on the rights scale, and the elasticity computed at the lowest (best rights) level on the rights scale. It thus 
reports the extent to which countries face variation in their output-governance elasticity. 
107 Measured as the ratio of output growth to investment growth. 
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110 Here oil discoveries led to strong increases in output – but rights remained essentially unchanged. 



































                                                 
112 A corollary here is that attempts to link aid to governance may not generate much effect for countries at 
very low levels of governance. Leaders in such countries may not know whether they face a Group VIII or 
a Group V scenario – and the risk of facing an output melt-down during a rights transition may be 
prohibitive. Performance intensity of aid here might have little impact.  
113 These include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Cuba, Georgia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, North 
Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Myanmar, Qatar, Russia, 








































































                                                 
114 Estimation for section 4.4 was by means of GAUSS. Relevant code was kindly contributed by 
Yongcheol Shin. 
115 Given the use of annual data, a lag length of 3 may appear more than adequate. However, since we are 
here investigating the impact of institutions and governance on long run economic development, we would 
have liked to explore higher order lags. Unfortunately, since we also control for human capital, and 
economic policy in a number of dimensions, degrees of freedom limitations prevented us from employing 
more liberal lag lengths. Exploration of optimal lag lengths in estimating the impact of governance remains 



























                                                 
116 The evidence presented in Appendix 4 provides a fuller explanation. Regression of the average years of 
schooling in the population on the other human capital measures  (the percentage of the population without 
schooling, with completed primary, secondary and high schooling), reported in column (1) of the Table in 
Appendix 4, reveals a strong statistical association among the various human capital measures. The weakest 
impact attaches to the percentage of the population that has completed primary schooling, with a 10% 
increase in the population with primary schooling leading to an increase in the average years of schooling 
of 0.2. By contrast, the equivalent increase in completed high schooling, leads to an increase of 1.4 years in 
average schooling. The reason is straightforward: the rising coefficients over primary, secondary and high 
schooling reflects the cumulative nature of education. There is thus some measure of double counting in 
our specifications –nevertheless all variables remain statistically significant. 
117 Readers should note that the country-specific estimation evidence of section 4.3 provides much the same 
evidence as the MGE does – though the MGE provides the summary information of the mean coefficients 
across countries. For the sake of parsimony, we report only specifications which include the composite 
rights variable, rather than both political rights and civil liberties. Results and implications are not affected 
by the choice of governance indicator. Full results for the individual rights indicators are available from the 





































                                                 
118 Independently of their specific evidence, similar evidence has been presented elsewhere, for instance 
Alvarez et al (2000) and Barro (1999). 
119 Of the North (1990) sort, say. It is a moot point whether this is an appropriate concern in a period 






































                                                 
120 See the evidence of Figure 8 of this paper, famously the arguments in Fukuyama (1992) and Huntingdon 






































                                                 
121 Recall that for what we termed Group V countries, the elasticity of output with respect to rights was 
strong and benevolent for countries with very good or very bad governance – it was weaker and perverse 



































                                                 
122 Where the loading matrix indicates that a dependent variable is adjusting into the long run equilibrium 
relationship provided by the cointegrating vector (which requires that the element of the loading matrix i is 
-2<i<0), this is consistent with the long run equilibrium relationship being a determinant of the dependent 
variable. Where adjustment into the long run equilibrium relationship is absent (i.e. -2>i>0), the dependent 
variable is not determined by the long run relationship given by the cointegrating vector, and hence can be 
considered to be weakly exogenous to the system. 










































































                                                 
124 This suggests that the unstable sign on the FDI variable that we have encountered thus far, may well be a 
result of attempting to fit a linear specification across the three distinct country groupings. 
125 Thus the test for homogeneity conducted across groups on individual coefficients did not reject the null 
of homogeneity, but the joint test of homogeneity of all coefficients across all groups did not consistently 
avoid rejecting the null. 
126 In estimation we did in fact explore this possibility – but the substantive points to emerge from the 


































                                                 
127 Note that as interaction terms proliferate, so the sensitivity of results to differing lag structures increases 
markedly. This stands in marked contrast to the results reported in other sections of this paper. Our 
interpretation is that the degree of heterogeneity between countries may well increase once we control for 
interactions. More research into possibly more differentiated country classes may well be a fruitful line of 
further research. 
128 See De Mello(1997) and Ramirez( 2000) on the positive externalities associated with FDI, while 
Blomstrom. Lipsey, and Zejan (1994) and Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) explore the growth 











































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                 
129 Note that more complex forms of non-linearity cannot be excluded – while the impact of YK, cannot be 
explicitly controlled for in the absence of physical capital stock data. Again more complex non-linearity in 
Kgg, as well as Ygg, and the impact of YK may intervene in preventing the isolation of the postulated non-





























































































































































                                                 
130 Once again we note that the FDI results appear to be implausibly strong. Possible interaction effects 
between FDI and aggregate investment may introduce bias into the estimated coefficient – a point already 
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Appendix 1: Definitions of Governance Variables 
 
Polity score (POLITY) – The polity score ranges from –10 to 10 (higher is more 
democratic).  The University of Maryland developed this indicator. It measures the 
following concepts of governance: competitiveness of chief executive recruitment; 
openness of chief executive recruitment; constraints on chief executive; regulation and 
competitiveness of participation; regulation of executive recruitment. The in-house expert 
opinion is used in constructing this indicator.  
Political rights (POL_RIGHT) – Raymond Gastil developed this indicator, now 
administered by Freedom House.  It measures free and fair elections for offices with real 
power; freedom of political organization; significance of opposition; freedom from 
domination by power groups; and political inclusion of minority groups.  Expert opinion 
is the source of this indicator.  The political rights measure ranges from 1 to 7 (lower is 
more free).      
Civil Liberties (CIV_LIB) – Raymond Gastil developed this indicator, now administered 
by Freedom House.  It measures freedom of expression and belief; freedom of association 
and organizational rights; rule of law and human rights; personal autonomy; and 
economic rights.  Expert opinion is the source of this indicator.  The political rights 
measure ranges from 1 to 7 (lower is more free).      
Free Press (PRESS) - Freedom House developed this governance indicator. It measures 
the following two concepts of governance: media objectivity and freedom of expression.  
Expert opinion is the source of this indicator.  The press freedom measure ranges from 0 
to 100 (lower is more free).      
Political Process (POL_PROC), Civil Society (CIV_SOC), Independent Media 
(IND_MED), Governance and Public Administration (GOV_PA), Constitutional, 
Legislative, and Judicial Framework (LAW) and Corruption (COR_FH) -  Freedom 
House developed these governance indicators for former socialist countries in 
cooperation with leading scholars from transition countries, Western Europe, and United 
States.  The survey methodology is used to construct these indicators that covers 28 
transition countries.  They rate countries on a comparative basis in reforming the political 
and economic process.  These measures of governance range from 1 to 7 (lower score 
represents more liberal political and economic process). 
Political Process (POL_PROC) examines national executive and legislative 
elections, the development of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the 
political process. The average of Political Process score is 3.85 and the median is 4.00. 
Civil Society (CIV_SOC) evaluates the development of NGOs and free trade unions, 
their organizational capacity, financial sustainability and participation in policy process, 
and the legal and political environment in which they function.  The average of Civil 
Society score is 3.60 and the median is 3.75. 
Independent Media (IND_MED) assesses the legal framework for and present state 
of press freedom.  The average of this score is 3.99 and the median is 4.25.  
Governance and Public Administration (GOV_PA) addresses the authority of 
legislative bodies, decentralization of power and legislative and executive transparency.  
Its average is 4.22 and the median is 4.50.   90
Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework (LAW) addresses 
constitutional reform, human rights protection, criminal code reform, the judiciary, and 
judicial independence.  This indicator’s average is 4.11 and the median is 4,25. 
Corruption (COR_FH) measures the perceptions of corruption in the civil service, 
the business interests of top policy makers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of 
interest, and anticorruption initiatives.  Its mean is 4.90 and the median is 5.25.              
Economic Opacity (OPAV), Regulation Opacity (REG_PWC), and Corruption 
(COR_PWC) – the PriceWaterhouseCoopers developed these governance indicators for 
35 countries around the world using survey methodology. These indicators address 
opacity (transparency) component of governance. The larger scores reflect more opacity, 
while smaller scores reflect more transparency.  
Economic Opacity (OPAC) addresses the predictability of government policy as 
reflected in fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies. 
Regulation Opacity (REG_PWC) assesses the presence or absence of clearly 
established rules for changing and/or consistently applying regulatory rules and 
procedures.  
Corruption (COR_PWC) considers the effects of corruption on the cost of capital 
through crowding out of capital markets because of widely used politically connected and 
corrupt lending practices.    
Regulation (HWJ), Government Intervention, Wages and Prices, Trade, Foreign 
Investment, Banking and Finance, Black Market, and Property Rights – The 
Heritage Foundation in cooperation with the Wall Street Journal developed these 
indicators as factors of the Economic Freedom Index.  These indicators of governance 
range from 1 to 5.  Lower scores indicate better governance.  
Regulation  (REG_HF)  measures how easy or difficult it is to open and operate 
business.  It addresses the following components: licensing requirements to operate a 
business, ease of obtaining a business license, corruption within the bureaucracy, labor 
regulations, and other regulations that impose burden on business. 
Government Intervention (GOV_INT) addresses government’s direct use of scarce 
resources for its own purposes and government’s control over resources through 
ownership.  It comprises both government consumption and government production. 
Wages and Prices (WP)  measures the extent to which a government allows the 
market to set wages and prices.  It looks at which products have prices set by the 
government, and whether government has a minimum wage policy or otherwise 
influences wages. 
Trade (TRADE) addresses the degree to which government hinders the free flow of 
foreign trade.  The score is given based on a country’s average tariff rate and other 
barriers to trade like import quotas, licensing requirements and mandates.  
Foreign Investment (FOR_INV)  considers countries regulations toward foreign 
investment.  It examines the investment laws and procedures.  
Banking and Finance (BANKING)  indicator measures the relative openness of 
banking and financial system in a country.  It is scored by assessing how difficult it is to 
open domestic banks and other financial services firms, how heavily regulated the 
financial system is, and whether foreign banks and financial services firms are able to 
operate freely.    91
Black Market (BLK_MKT)  indicator is scored relying on Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and the specific procedures that consider the 
extent to which black market activities occur.  It measures black market activities in the 
production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services. 
Property Rights (PROPERTY) measures the degree to which private property rights 
are protected and the degree to which the government enforces laws that protect private 
property.  It also considers the independence of the judiciary and the ability of individuals 
and businesses to enforce contracts.          
 Contract Intensive Money (CIM) measures the proportion of the money supply that is 
held in the bank accounts and as other financial assets.  The percentage of contract 
intensive money indicates in part how much faith investors have in the government’s 
ability and willingness to enforce financial contracts, and to refrain from expropriating 
financial assets.  It is a measure of trust in banks and in the government.  Contract 
intensive money is calculated as one minus the ratio of currency outside of banks to the 
money supply.  
Trade Tax (TRTAX) indicator estimates the share of trade taxes as a percentage of total 
government revenues.  It reflects government’s administrative capacity and trade policy. 
Trade Tax Controlling for Population (trtax_p) is adjusted for country size by 
calculating the deviation of trade tax revenues from the value that would be expected 
based on country size.   Data on trade tax revenues included in the IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics.  
Business Start-up Procedures-Number of Procedures (BSP_NOP), Business Start-
up Procedures-Time (BSP_T) and Business Start-up Procedures-Cost (BSP_C) –  
These indicators address procedures, time, and costs of starting new businesses across 
countries.  Data are collected from government publications, reports of development 
agencies, and local law firms.  The focus is a “standardized firm” that operates in the 
largest city, performing general industrial or commercial activities.    
Business Start-up Procedures-Number of Procedures (BSP_NOP) assesses the 
number of procedures that are officially required to obtain all necessary permits and 
completing all of the required notifications for the company to operate legally.  
Business Start-up Procedures-Time (BSP_T) estimates the minimum number of 
business days required to complete the business start-up process assuming no delays by 
government officials.  
Business Start-up Procedures-Cost (BSP_C) evaluates the cost of business start up 
in fees, photocopies, notary charges, etc.    
Budget Volatility (BUD_VOL) assesses the coherence and predictability of government 
policy for business.  It assumes that to the extent that policy decisions are captured in the 
budget, then stable policy should be reflected in stable budget allocations, and vice versa.  
This indicator is estimated as the median of the year-to-year changes in each of the 14 
functional budget classifications over the preceding 4 years, where budget changes are 
defined as the difference in expenditure shares for each functional classification from 
year n to year n+1, calculated as a proportion of the year n figure.  Primary data that are 
used to construct budget volatility indicator is available from the IMF’s Government 
Financial Statistics.    
Regulation of Dispute Resolution Index-Eviction of Tenant (EVICT), Regulation of 
Dispute Resolution Index-Check Collection (CHK_COL) – By surveying members of   92
the largest international association of law firms, data have been collected on the number 
of “independent procedural actions” required to file a complaint and to obtain and enforce 
a judgment in each of two areas of dispute: eviction of non-paying tenants, and collection 
of overdue debt.  These indices estimate the duration in days from initiation to 
completion of the process, for debt collection and for rent eviction.  They reflect only 
procedures for simple cases, where facts are not in dispute, and the amount of the claim is 
relatively small.         
Policy Unpredictability (POL_UNP) indicator addresses businesspersons’ perceptions 
of policy unpredictability as an obstacle to conducting business.  It is obtained from 
World Development Report’s (1997) Private Sector Survey.  The respondents are asked, 
“Do you regularly have to cope with unexpected changes in rules, laws, or policies which 
materially affect your business?” on a scale of 1 to 6 (1 is completely predictable, 6 is 
completely unpredictable).  The score for this indicator is the average answer from all 
businesspersons surveyed in the country. 
Quality of Service (QUAL_SER) indicator assesses perceptions of quality of 
government service.  It is obtained from World Development Report’s (1997) Private 
Sector Survey.  The respondents are asked to “rate the efficiency of government in 
delivering services” on a scale of 1 to 6 (1 indicates very efficient and 6 indicates very 
inefficient).  The score for this indicator is the average answer from the country’s 
respondents.   
Growth Competitiveness Index (GCOMP) – The GCI measures the capacity of the 
national economy to achieve sustained economic growth over the medium term, 
controlling for current level of development.  It is published by the World Economic 
Forum.   
Microeconomic Competitiveness Index (CCOMP) – The MCI is the weighted average 
of the two indices that measure the quality of the national business environment and the 
sophistication of company operations and strategy.  This index is published by the World 
Economic Forum.  In the 2004 World Competitiveness Report, it is renamed the Business 
Competitiveness Index. 
Corruption Perceptions Index (COR_TI) - Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived 
to exist among public officials and politicians.  CPI relates to perceptions of the degree of 
corruption as seen by business people, academics, and risk analysts.  It ranges between 10 
(very clean) and 0 (very corrupt).  
The next six indicators of governance are from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators 
Report, perhaps the most sophisticated analysis of governance measures.  In fact, this 
report includes proprietary World Bank and other data not available to the public.  All six 
indicators vary between –2.5 (lowest quality of governance) and 2.5 (high quality).   
Voice and Accountability (VA) includes in it a number of indicators measuring 
various aspects of political process, civil liberties and political rights. 
Political Stability (PS) combines several indicators that measure perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possible 
unconstitutional means. 
Government Effectiveness  (GE), which combines perceptions of the quality and 
competence of civil service, the independence of public service from political pressure, 
and credibility of government into a single group.    93
Regulatory Quality (RQ) measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies as 
well as perception of the burdens imposed by excessive regulations.  
The Rules of Law (RL)  indicator  includes several indicators, which measure the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. 
Control of Corruption (CONCOR) is sixth cluster. It measures perceptions of 
corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public service for private gain.  
 
The following indicators have been obtained from Political Systems of the World of 
J Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire (1996) 
 
Nation States or sovereign states defined following Lane and Ersson (1994) as “a state 
that recognizes no higher decision-making power outside itself”.  The nation-state, or 
‘stato’, of the Weberian type, is characterized by the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
force within a specified territory and the concentration of power in an impersonal 
administrative organization. 
1
st Year of State Formation indicates first date at which nation state was 
established 
2
nd Year of State Formation indicates second date at which nation state was 
established  
 
Regions classifies the geographic locations of the countries concerned and have been 
chosen by Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) as the most manageable way to demonstrate 
the link between the history; geography and social development of these countries. The 
nine regions are: Asia; Central America and the Caribbean; Central, Eastern, and 
Southern Europe; Central and Southern Africa (essentially Sub-Saharan Africa); the 
Middle East and North Africa; North America; Northern and Western Europe; Oceania; 
South America. 
 
Colonization - Colonizing powers listed are Australia; Belgium; Britain; China; France; 
Italy; Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; South Africa; Russia (then USSR); USA.  Various 
countries have emerged from a prior state of administration by another .  These variables 
indicate the last external power (if any) to have administered a specific country. 
Year of decolonization or transfer of sovereignty indicates the year in 
which the country was granted independence. 
Date of establishment of control indicates the year in which the last 
colonizing power established power in that country. 
 
An Ideological base is defined by a specific body of ideas which reflects the beliefs and 
values of a nation and its political system.  Political regimes are identified as follows:  
Liberal Democracy (Lib-dem) is a product of two concepts: the right to 
representative government (Liberal) and the right to enjoy individual freedom 
(democracy).  
Emergent Democracy (Em-dem) is attributed to states with instability in 
their political systems but which do bear many characteristics of Liberal 
democracy. 
Communism (Commun) is characterized by four distinguishing features:   94
1.  Marxism-Leninism (in the case of China, Maoism-Dengism) has been 
adopted as the official ideology, source of legitimacy, and vocabulary of 
the political affairs.   
2.  The bulk of economic activity is under state ownership and subject to 
administrative (central) planning. 
3.  One party, the Communist Party, dominates the political scene and is 
tightly controlled from above in accordance with the Leninist precept of 
“democratic centralism”. 
4.  The influence of the Communist Party, constitutionally ascribed a leading 
role” in the nation’s affairs, is all-pervasive, controlling state organs, trade 
unions, the media, the judiciary, and the industrial and agricultural 
enterprises through both supervision and direct membership. 
National Socialism (Nat-soc) categorizes states in which many of the 
attributes of a communist state are present but in  a less developed and structured 
form. 
Authoritarian Nationalism (Auth-nat) indicates an extreme kind of 
nationalism that rests on the belief that a specific race or creed is so unique that 
they have the right to be regarded a nation and to exclude others.  Features of a 
state that subscribes to this ideology are: 
1.  Restrictions on the activities of all political parties, or a limitation to one 
which gives undivided and uncritical support to the state. 
2.  An authoritarian charismatic personal or collective executive. 
3.  Either the absence of an assembly to balance the power of the executive or 
the presence of an assembly which is essentially the servant of the 
executive. 
Military Authoritarianism is a form of authoritarian nationalism whereby 
military leaders take it upon themselves to impose a government on the people by 
overthrowing civilian administrations. 
Islamic Nationalism is attributed to those states in which Islamic 
fundamentalism fulfills a political function. 
Absolutism is attributed to states with an absolute monarch as the legitimate 
government. 
 
Political executives are defined as the permanent executive consisting of the salaried 
civil service which normally remains in office regardless of the political party in power.  
Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) have divided political executives into seven types: 
Parliamentary executive often referred to as the “Westminster model” and 
displays three essential features: 
1.  The role of head of state is separate from that of the head of government 
and is distant from party politics, serving mainly as the patriotic and 
ceremonial focus of the nation. 
2.  The executive is drawn from the assembly and directly responsible to it, 
and its security of tenure is dependent on the support of the assembly, or 
parliament.   95
3.  The leader of the party, or coalition of parties, commanding the support of 
parliament is called upon by the head of state, monarch or president, to 
become prime minister and form a government. 
An example is the United Kingdom. 
Limited presidential executive is characterized by four key features: 
1.  Presidents are elected for a fixed term to perform the dual role of head of 
state and head of government 
2.  Presidents’ tenure are secure unless they commit a grave unconstitutional 
act. 
3.  Presidents govern with an advisory cabinet of nonelected departmental 
secretaries, whom they choose and appoint and who are fully responsible 
to them. 
4.  Presidential powers are limited by the need for the approval of the 
assembly for certain executive actions. 
An example is the USA. 
The Dual executive provides for a president with considerable power, 
including appointment of the senior executive, the prime minister and cabinet are 
expected to wield ultimate power, while the president remains aloof from day to 
day politics.  An example is France.  
The Communist executive: the Communist Party determines policy 
objectives and it is the state apparatus which implements them.  The constitution 
is subservient to the needs of the state, as interpreted by the party and is often 
changed to meet party requirements. 
The (unlimited) Presidential executive is found in one-party, non-communist 
states 
The Military: the military acts as executive. 
The Absolute executive applies to monarchies and not imposed following a 
coup. 
 
Lower house electoral system – voting systems 
Indirect: Lower House members elected by another representative or 
institutional body 
Simple Plurality (SP): “winner-takes-all ‘first-past-the-post’” method. 
Elected / Appointed (mixed E/A) 
Proportional representation – party list (PR-PL): proportional 
representation under political party lists. 
Proportional representation – additional member system (PR-AMS): 
makes use of party lists but also allows the elector two votes – one for the 
candidate and one for the party.  Half the assembly is then elected on a SB or SP 
basis and the other half using the party lists. 
Proportional representation  - single transferable vote (PR-STV): 
proportional representation with voters providing rankings of candidates. 
Second ballot (SB): A simple majority election is held and if no candidate 
gets more that 50% of the total vote, the candidate with the least votes is 
eliminated and a second election is held. 
Appointed (A): Lower House members appointed, rather than voted for.   96
Transitional (TRANS): states where established political order has 
disintegrated, without replacement by another. 
 
Political Parties: can be described as an association of people who hold similar views 
about what should be a community’s social and economic priorities and come together to 
establish these priorities by gaining control of the machinery of government.  The modern 
party displays three essential features: a permanent structure and organization; an 
authority to represent people, whether or not they are members of the party, based on 
open elections; and, an intention to form a government or participate in government. 
Number of parties regularly operating (does not include all registered 
parties and is an approximation in some cases because the emergence and 
disappearance of minor groupings is often a notable feature of some political 
systems) 
Number of parties with >10% of assembly seats:  97
Appendix 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics 
 
Country RGDP Investment  Political  Rights  Civil Liberties  Composite Rights 
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Angola  -1.5893 
(-3.0660)‡ 
-2.5039 
































Armenia‼  -1.3131 
(-3.5512)‡ 
-4.4648* 












Australia  .58862 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-4.5137* 
(-2.9907)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
Austria  -1.1908 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-5.2776* 
(-2.9907) -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
Azerbaijan‼  -2.3059 
(-3.2197)‡ 
-1.3890 








Bahamas  -3.6819* 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-4.1617* 












Bahrain  -.58931 
(-3.0819)‡ 
-3.7223* 
































Barbados  -1.0976 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.2225* 
(-2.9907) -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
Belarus‼  -3.3136* 
(-3.2698)‡ 
-1.0251 












Belgium  -.38034 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-5.0419* 
(-2.9907)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
Belize  -.50073 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.1399* 
































Bhutan  -.93796 
(-3.0660)‡ 
-3.7775* 
































Bosnia‼  -2.3245 
(-4.0703)‡ 
-6.6525* 




















































Brunei  -1.1783 
(-3.0115)‡ 
-3.6920* 












Bulgaria  -2.2520 
(-3.0660)‡ 
-2.5974 




















































Cambodia  -1.0073 
(-3.2698)‡ 
-5.0254* 
































Canada  -.58940 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.3655* 
(-2.9907)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
Cape Verde  1.3335 
(-3.0819)‡ 
-3.1129* 












Cen. Afr. Rep.  -1.2019 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-5.6016* 












Chad  -2.2921 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-4.8695* 








































































Congo Brazz.  -.26057 
(-2.9970)‡ 
-2.2050 












Costa Rica  -.72213 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.0654* 




























Croatia‼  -3.9081* 
(-3.5512)‡ 
-1.1328 
























Cyprus  -1.1110 
(-3.0115)‡ 
-5.2903* 












Czech Rep.  -1.8893 
(-3.5512) 
-3.6663* 
(-3.7449) -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
Denmark  -.32814 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-4.9457* 
(-2.9907)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
Djibouti  -1.5159 
(-3.2698)‡ 
-.42064 




























































































Equat. Guin.‼  1.4468 
(-3.1803)‡ 
-1.9520 












Eritrea‼  -.78647 
(-4.0703)‡ 
1.6179 












Estonia‼  -2.0673 
(-3.0660)‡ 
-1.7085 












Ethiopia  -1.4660 
(-3.0819)‡ 
-3.7602* 












Fiji  -2.0820 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-6.4423* 












Finland  -.14072 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.1253* 












France  -1.2451 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.2128* 
















































Georgia‼  -1.6059 
(-3.5512)‡ 
-1.4270 












Germany  -1.3973 
(-2.9907)‡ 
-3.0002* 




































































Guinea  .38944 
(-3.2197)‡ 
-3.0390 












Guinea-Bissau  -2.6587 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-5.8907* 























































































Iceland  -2.0513 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.1089* 
(-2.9907)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 








































Iran  -2.7321 
(-3.0039)‡ 
-3.3453* 
























Ireland  2.6857 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-2.5410 




























Italy  -2.6541 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.9504* 
































Japan  -1.4392 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.1672* 












Jordan  -2.6395 
(-3.0115)‡ 
-3.0707* 












Kasakhstan‼  -1.6816 
(-3.4243)‡ 
-1.3037 
































Korea N  -  -  -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 








































Kyrgyzstan‼  -4.1306* 
(-3.2197)‡ 
-1.5543 












Laos  -.66330 
(-3.1485)‡ 
-4.7998* 












Latvia‼  -2.3059 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-2.5930 












Lebanon  -5.0513* 
(-3.3353)‡ 
-.45597 
























































Lithuania‼  -7.2539* 
(-3.2698)‡ 
-2.8542 












Luxembourg  1.4072 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.9403* 
(-2.9907)‡ - -  -3.4069* 
(-2.9706)
-5.2915* 




Macedonia‼  -.29110 
(-3.5512)‡ 
-1.8044 








































































Maldives  -.71434 
(-3.1485)‡ 
-3.4737* 
































Malta  -.15979 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-4.4531* 








































































Moldova‼  -.32531 
(-3.0660)‡ 
-3.4204* 












Mongolia  -2.7491 
(-3.0819)‡ 
-2.1821 
































Mozambique  -.13907 
(-3.0660)‡ 
-3.5406* 
























Namibia  -.28808 
(-3.0660)‡ 
-3.6327* 




























Netherlands  1.3829 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.0005* 
(-2.9907)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
New Zealand  -.45897 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.3156* 
(-2.9907)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 




























































Norway  -1.0180 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-4.0897* 
(-2.9907)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
Oman  -.78296 
(-3.0199)‡ 
-4.0898* 





























































































































Poland‼  -4.4536* 
(-3.5512)‡ 
-.85075 












































Rumania  -1.7333 
(-3.0115)‡ 
-2.2926 












Russia‼  -3.2371* 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-1.7622 

















































Saudi Arabia  -1.9770 
(-3.2197)‡ 
.67670 
































Sierra Leone  1.8770 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-2.3181 
































Slovakia‼  -2.5013 
(-3.1485)‡ 
-1.4199 












Slovenia‼  2.6459 
(-3.5512)‡ 
-2.4340 
(-3.7449)‡ - -  -2.5298 
(-3.2197)
-3.0000 





















Somalia  - - - -  -.20000 
(-2.9850)
-4.8990* 
































































Sudan  -.72331 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.7181* 












Suriname  -1.8877 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.9673* 
































Sweden  .22755 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.2400* 
(-2.9907)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
Switzerland  -1.3958 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-4.2367* 
(-2.9907)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
































Tajikistan‼  -2.4955 
(-3.1803)‡ 
-1.9405 












Tanzania  -.47612 
(-3.3353)‡ 
-1.3308 
















































































































Turkmenistan  -2.0685 
(-3.2698)‡ 
-.83666 
(-3.3353)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 
Uganda  -.0080794 
(-3.1004)‡ 
-3.5263* 












Ukraine‼  -2.4159 
(-3.2698)‡ 
-.43961 
(-3.3353)‡ - -  -.40825 
(-3.5512)
-2.2361 




UAE  -1.2062 
(-3.0115)‡ 
-4.1467* 
(-3.0199)‡ - -  -1.5513 
(-2.9850)
-6.7759* 




UK  .15045 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.5302* 








USA  -.48123 
(-2.9850)‡ 
-3.7420* 
(-2.9907)‡ -  -  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var.  No Var. 




















Uzbekistan  -17.7721* 
(-3.2698)‡ 
-13.5214* 
































Vietnam  -1.7931 
(-3.1485)‡ 
-1.3267 












Yemen  -3.5294 
(-3.5512)‡ 
-2.6140 










































































Figures in round parentheses denote critical values of the relevant ADF statistic. 
‼ denotes few data points. ADF unreliable. 
No Var. denotes no variation in the relevant variable. 
* denotes statistically significant rejection of the null of non-stationarity. 
‡ denotes the use of the natural logarithmic scale for the income and investment variables. 
† denotes the use of the normal scale for the income and investment variables. 
€ denotes the use of 1971-89, 1993-2002 subsamples.  




Country CL←PR PR←CL lnY  Int.  lnI  CivLib  Polright Rights  lnY  ECM1  ECM2  λmax λtrace
                    r  =0  r  ≤1 r ≤2 r =0  r ≤1 r ≤2 










         








             










             
Benin  5.49**  1.03  lnY 
VAR=4 








38.92* 32.36* 14.00 85.28* 46.36* 14.00 
      Civlib 
VAR=4 
     .77* 
{37.82} 




       
Bhutan  6.73*  .60  lnY 
VAR=4 
   .32* 
{13.36} 




29.41* 13.86** .14 43.40* 14.00 .14 
     Civlib 
VAR=4 
     .78* 
{7.29} 





       
Bolivia CL~I(0) PR~I(1)  lnY 
VAR=3 
  .24* 
{18.50} 
  .04* 
{18.73} 
   -.32** 
(.16) 
  31.58* 12.83 .1E-3 44.41* 12.83 .1E-3 








  15.40* 6.79    22.19* 6.79  








          
Burkina 
Faso 
1.50  5.08*  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .37* 
{18.77} 




  24.52* 12.85 5.00 42.37* 17.85 5.00 
Cambodia  5.51**  8.20*  lnY 
VAR=3 




  28.65* 5.33   33.98* 5.33  
Cameroon  4.76  2.84  lnY 
VAR=5 
  .49* 
{7.88} 




  30.42* 15.32*   51.46* 21.04*  








           
Cent. 
African Rep. 








   -.52** 
(.27) 
             
Chad  2.47  3.78               10.26 .18   10.44 .17  
Chile  .46  2.05  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .52* 
{13.73} 









2.36  1.23  lnY 
VAR=1 
  .42* 
{19.41} 




  25.62* 6.15 3.54 35.32 9.70 3.54 
Colombia  .24  .62  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .29* 
{ 6.38} 




  21.50* 13.63 1.50 36.62* 15.13 1.50 




  .22* 
(.07) 
   -.23* 
(.10) 
           
Cote d Ivoire  2.93  1.74  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .33* 
{20.93} 




  36.84* 4.45 .23 41.53* 4.68 .23 
Cyprus  4.89  2.01  RIGHTS 
VAR=5 




  15.36* 2.84   18.20* 2.84  
Dominican 
Republic 
2.28  2.52  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .45* 
{30.99} 
   -.05* 
{28.76} 
  -.68* 
(.04) 
  35.55* 7.05 4.56 47.17 11.61 4.56 
Egypt  4.69  1.33  lnY 
VAR=5 
  .60* 
{8.05} 
   .30* 
{8.57} 




2.85  3.46  lnY 
VAR=3 
  .38* 
{12.06} 
   -.04* 
{25.99} 
  -.41* 
(.20) 




.90  4.47  lnY 
VAR=5 
      -.03* 
{15.85} 
  -.36* 
(.15) 
  21.03* 4.88   25.92 4.88  
Finland 
trend= .03 
CL=PR CL=PR  lnY 
VAR=4 
       .10* 
{17.93} 
  -.72* 
(.14) 




CL=PR CL=PR  lnY 
VAR=2 
  .98* 
{8.48} 
   -.19 
{ 6.57} 
  -.01** 
(.004) 
  30.84* 17.24 6.39 54.47* 23.63 6.39 




     -.01* 
(.004) 
  -.44* 
(.20) 
         
Ghana  .93  1.21  lnY 
VAR=3 
  .37 
{14.98} 
   -.01 
{13.82} 
  -.72* 
(.16) 
  29.23* 19.73* 14.02* 62.99* 33.75* 14.02* 
Greece 
trend = .01 
1.92  3.75  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .31* 
{17.66} 
   -.02* 
{6.90} 
  -.32* 
(.11) 




CL~I(0) PR~I(1)  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .35* 
{7.83} 
   -.05* 
{11.33} 
  -.50** 
(.24) 
  23.44 15.62 9.47 48.52* 25.09 9.47 
Guinea 
Bissau 
1.04  9.29*  lnY 
VAR=4 
trend= .01 
  .10** 
{3.33} 




37.19* 28.89* 12.27 78.36* 41.16* 12.27 
     Polright 
VAR=4 
trend= -.06 
   .61** 
{3.33} 




       
Guyana  1.14  2.82  lnY 
VAR=1 
  .14* 
{5.61} 
   -.05* 
{17.56} 
  -.42* 
(.09) 
  27.50* 7.90 2.73 38.13* 10.63 2.73 
Haiti  2.64  1.22  lnY 
VAR=2 
  .35* 
{6.58} 
   .12* 
{18.24} 
  -.01* 
(.003) 
  27.15* 8.87 .02 36.04* 8.90 .02 
Honduras CL~I(0) PR~I(1)  lnY 
VAR=2 
  .05* 
{8.87} 
  .01* 
{7.72} 
   -.70* 
(.10) 




.71  .91  lnY 
VAR=4 
  1.15* 
{38.43} 
   .14* 
{22.32} 
  -.24* 
(.06) 
  56.61* 17.96 5.93 80.50* 23.89 5.93 
India  6.13*  1.79  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .55* 
{16.41} 
   -.005* 
{24.19} 
  -.98* 
(.28) 
  28.26* 4.19 4.03 36.49* 8.22 4.03 




  -.04* 
{21.78} 
  -.15** 
(.09) 
  26.65* 11.81 7.48 45.94* 19.29 7.48 




    .09* 
(.04) 
  -.30* 
(.07) 
         




   -.12* 
{15.41} 
  -.08* 
(.03) 
  21.40 7.81 5.73 34.95* 13.55 5.73 
Italy 
trend = .01 
2.36  3.41  lnY 
VAR=4 
      -.03* 
{17.38} 
  -.52* 
(.10) 




5.29**  6.00*  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .41* 
{39.46} 
   -.01* 
{35.52} 
  -.01** 
(.003) 
  49.71* 15.13 10.05 74.89* 25.18 10.05 
Japan  .59  2.21  lnY 
VAR=4 
14.11     -.93* 
{6.29} 
  -.01* 
(.004) 
  15.21 5.37   20.59* 5.37  
Jordan  7.16*  11.59*  lnY 
VAR=4 
trend= -.03 
     -1.26* 
{11.30} 




28.97* 23.51* 12.22 64.70* 35.73* 12.22 
     Polright 
VAR=4 
trend= -.06 
   .93* 
{21.67} 




       




                   5.14 1.74   6.88 1.74  








  23.20* 8.53  .48  32.22* 9.01  .48 
Laos 
trend = .04 
2.55  5.57  lnY 
VAR=4 
      -.22 
{26.64} 
  -.33* 
(.10) 
  84.30* 24.93*   109.24* 24.93*  
Lesotho 
trend = .02 
.78  3.16  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .13 
{.36} 








.44  .78  lnY 
VAR=5 
  .22* 
{27.19} 
   -.002* 
{27.08} 
  -.004* 
(.002) 
  34.93* 10.78 4.61 50.33* 15.40 4.61 
Malawi  .63E-6  2.97  lnY 
VAR=1 
  .16* 
{16.03} 




  25.98* 4.82 .72 31.52* 5.54 .72 
Malaysia  .91  9.51*  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .40 
(.01) 
  .04** 
{3.07} 




71.83* 23.73* 4.19 
.80 
100.55* 28.72* 4.99 
.80 





  .72* 
{.46} 




       
Maldives  3.26  .51               13.45 .66   14.12 .66  






   .02** 
{3.79} 
  -.27** 
(.16) 
  27.21* 15.84 3.03 46.08* 18.88 3.03 
Malta  2.91  2.18  lnY 
VAR=4 
      -.19* 
{15.54} 
  -.07* 
(.01) 
  16.41* .60   17.01* .60  
Mauritania  3.38  .96  lnY 
ARDL(1,0,2) 
  -.01 
(.02) 
  -.05* 
(.02) 
  -.57* 
(.20) 
  22.25 8.02 .88 31.15 8.90 .88 
Mauritius  1.66  1.33  lnY 
VAR=2 
  .45 
{9.19} 
   -.20 
{22.54} 
  -.33* 
(.09) 
  34.15* 10.39 .11 44.65* 10.50 .10 








  39.17* 11.28 1.76 52.22* 13.04 1.76 
Morocco  4.81  .91  lnY 
VAR=4 
  1.46* 
{25.60} 
   .01 
{.27} 
  -.004* 
(.002) 
  42.41* 13.41 5.09 60.91 18.50* 5.09 
Mozambique  .98  6.44*  lnY 
VAR=4 
     -.10 
{38.33} 




42.91* 25.21* 4.46 72.59* 29.68 4.46 
     Polright 
VAR=4 
   1.03* 
{20.28} 




       
Nicaragua  7.90*  .40  lnY 
VAR=4 
trend = -.05 




    -
.004** 
(.002) 
  34.27* 8.14 5.36 47.78* 13.50 5.36 




   .79* 
(.12) 
   -.88* 
(.21) 
         
Niger  .96  18.83*  lnY 
VAR=4 
trend = -.01 
  .33* 
{14.96} 
  -.02* 
{16.59} 
   -.51* 
(.21) 
  30.50* 15.44 6.95 52.89* 22.39 6.95 




  1.53* 
(.07) 
   -1.90* 
(.34) 
         
Nigeria  1.59  4.05  lnY 
VAR=4 
trend = -.01 
  .18* 
{5.95} 
   .02* 
{25.23} 
  -1.01* 
(.26) 
  33.47* 8.87 3.41 45.74* 12.27 3.41 
Oman CL~I(1)  PR~I(0) lnY 
VAR=2 
      -3.07* 
{15.28} 
  -.10* 
(.03) 
  18.21* 2.01   20.22* 2.01  
Pakistan CL~I(0)  PR~I(1)  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .56* 
{11.70} 
   -.01* 
{15.73} 
  -.49* 
(.28) 
  23.55* 8.22 2.30 34.08* 10.52 2.30 
Panama  1.53  .55  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .22* 
{21.93} 
   .02* 
{7.18} 
  -.81* 
(.31) 
  45.78* 14.52 5.44 65.75* 19.96* 5.44 
Papua New 
Guinea 
CL~I(1) PR~I(0)  lnY 
VAR=4 
      .13* 
{7.00} 
  -1.16* 
(.30) 
  23.04* 9.64   32.68* 9.64    107
trend = .01 
Peru  2.28  4.23               17.42 7.80 2.16 27.39 9.96 2.16 






   .01 
(.01) 
  -.19** 
(.11) 
         
     lnI 
VAR=4 
      .17* 
{11.82} 
  -.46 
(.19) 
  19.81* 7.22   27.03 7.22  
Portugal  1.20  9.61*  lnY 
VAR=2 
  .50* 
{15.74} 
  -.17* 
{34.41} 
   -.11* 
(.05) 
  54.77* 16.90* .40 72.08* 17.30 .40 
     Polright 
ARDL(1,1) 
   .63* 
{15.13} 
    -.71* 
(.10) 
  31.62* 1.50   33.12* 1.50  
Rwanda  1.03  1.58  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .34* 
{16.30} 
   -.39* 
{24.55} 
  -.08** 
(.04) 
t-3 
  26.13* 9.48 1.19 36.79* 10.66 1.19 
Singapore  2.48  2.47  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .97* 
{21.70} 
   .08*
{34.27} 
  -.08* 
(.01) 
  42.62* 8.35 3.80 54.77 12.15 3.80 
South Africa  2.01  8.47*  lnY 
VAR=5 
trend = -.003 
  .40* 
{30.60} 
  .02* 
{30.79} 
   -.48* 
(.14) 
  36.44* 16.22 4.83 57.48* 21.05 4.83 




  1.18* 
(.30) 
   -.26** 
(.15) 
         
Spain  22.96*  5.77*  lnY 
VAR=2 
trend = .02 
  .24* 
{11.02} 
   .01* 
{26.21} 
  -.20* 
(.07) 
  37.16* 14.89 9.28 61.33* 24.17 9.28 
Sri Lanka  4.28  .84  lnY 
VAR=2 
  .62* 
{25.01} 
   .04* 
{22.42} 
  -.03** 
(.01) 
  26.03* 6.17 .44 32.63* 6.61 .44 
Sudan  2.07  6.95*  lnY 
VAR=5 
     2.05* 
{17.22} 
   -.04* 
(.01) 
  19.12* 1.89   21.00* 1.89  




  1.18* 
(.12) 
    -.80* 
(.11) 
         
Suriname  2.84  1.20  lnY 
VAR=4 
       -.05** 
{3.60} 
  -.42* 
(.14) 
  11.28 6.61   17.89* 6.61  
Swaziland  3.59  2.91  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .54* 
{24.04} 
   .16* 
{20.08} 
  -.38* 
(.16) 
  42.57* 13.04 2.49 58.10* 15.53 2.49 
Syria  3.82  1.61  lnY 
VAR=2 
trend = .02 
  .23* 
{10.45} 
   -.09* 
{14.25} 
  -1.06* 
(.19) 
  26.41* 9.05 3.20 38.65* 12.24 3.20 
Thailand  2.92  .49  lnY 
VAR=5 
trend = .04 
  .22* 
{7.75} 
   .03* 
{23.99} 
  -.61** 
(.33) 
  31.12* 7.44 2.66 41.22* 10.10 2.66 
Togo  1.89  .22  lnY 
VAR=4 
trend = .01 
  .07 
{1.42} 
   .17* 
{15.95} 
  -1.42* 
(.37) 
  24.37* 16.86 8.41 49.64* 25.27 8.41 
Trinidad  1.07  1.44  lnY 
VAR=1 
trend = 7.10 
  .15 
{1.66} 
   .10** 
{3.33} 
  -.26* 
(.04) 
  23.84* 6.23 2.54 32.61* 8.77 2.54 
Tunisia  2.58  1.70  lnY 
VAR=4 
  .77* 
{28.68} 
   -.31* 
{28.74} 
  -1.02 
(.70) 
  30.01* 16.34 1.22 47.58* 17.57 1.22 
Turkey  2.51  3.47               10.28 .001   10.28 .001  
UAE  CL~I(0)  PR~I(1)               13.84 4.93   18.76 4.93  
UK  CL~I(1)  PR~I(0)               15.48 3.93   19.41 3.93  




   -.02 
{23.53} 
  -.37** 
(.21) 
  34.11* 13.78 .10 47.99* 13.88 .10 




   -.02* 
{18.08} 
  -.60 
(.30) 
  27.21* 15.43 9.04 51.68* 24.47 9.04 
Zambia  .69  2.39  lnY 
VAR=1 
  .19* 
{11.08} 
   -.002* 
{11.45} 
  -.32* 
(.13) 
  22.49* 11.13 5.95 39.56* 17.08 5.95 
Zimbabwe  3.62  1.83  lnI        -.10    -.41*    14.82 4.40   19.23* 4.40    108
VAR=4  {.48} (.11)
 
λmax, λtrace, denote the maximal eigenvalue and trace test statistics for the number of cointegrating vectors respectively. r²i denotes the 
null of the test statistic. * denotes significance of the test statistic at the 5% level. 
lnY denotes the log of real output. 
lnI denotes the log of real investment. 
CivLib, Polright, Rights denote the civil liberties, political rights and composite rights indicators respectively. 
ECMi denotes the error correction term. 
Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors. 
Figures in curly parentheses denote test statistics for significance distributed chi-square.  
Significance of coefficients is denoted * at the 5%, ** at the 10% level. 
CL←PR, PR←CL, denote two F-tests for any potential direction of association between the two individual rights measures.
131 
Significance of the test rejects the null of no association. 
 
                                                 
131 See Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) for details of the test.   109
Appendix 4: Association between Human Capital Variables 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Estimator:  PMGE PMGE PMGE PMGE 
Sample:  Full Sample  Rights <7  7<Rights<11  Rights>11 
Info.  Criterion:  ARDL(3) ARDL(3) ARDL(3) ARDL(3) 














































      
































RLL  5680.70 1982.74 3880.45 1069.07 
ULL  6606.85 2358.57 4410.07 1206.54 
Table: Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Estimation: PMGE denotes pooled mean group estimators; * denotes significance at the 5%, ** at the 10% levels; 
 denotes the adjustment to the long run equilibrium term; h-test denotes the Hausman test statistic under the null of long-run homogeneity, RLL and 








Laws and norms  
(including rights, obligations, incentives, and penalties) 
 
 
Institutional structures         Quality  of  property 
(judicial, legislative, executive branches of government;     rights, rule of law, and 
and at a finer grain:  courts, police, executive agencies, etc.)      enforcement of contracts 
 
 
Policies within and management of these institutions 
 
 
Citizens’ and firms’ knowledge of and acceptance of 








Problem Illustration  Consequence  under 
Standard Estimator  
& Cure
Type Ia  it it i it YX C α βγ ε =+ + + 
(,)0 , (, )0 ii t i i t Cov C Y Cov C X ≠≠  
Ci unobserved 
Figure 2  Bias & Inconsistency;  
Fixed Effects (FE) 
Type Ib  it it i it YX C α βγ ε =+ + + 
(, ) 0 it it Cov X ε ≠  






it i t t ij it j ij it j i it
jj
YYX a Y b X φ βμ ε −− − −
==
Δ= − + Δ + Δ ++ ∑∑  
Heterogeneity in ai, bi, across groups. 
Possibility 1: β not homogeneous across all groups (MGE): distinct      
                      steady state across groups 
Possibility 2: β homogenous across all groups (PMGE): distinct steady  














it i t X t ij it j ij it j i it
jj
YY X a Y b X φ βμ ε −− − −
==
Δ= − + Δ + Δ ++ ∑∑  
Heterogeneity in ai, bi, across groups. 
Non-linearity: β homogenous across groups for ranges of X, but not 
across whole domain of X. 





Table 1: Summary of Distinct Heterogeneity Types, Illustrations of the Impact of the Heterogeneity, and Proposed Solutions.   112
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Figure 3: Impact of Heterogeneous Long Run Slope Coefficients, Heterogeneous Short Run Dynamics, and Fixed Effects. Solid lines represent long run 
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Figure 4: Impact of Homogeneous Long Run Slope Coefficients, Heterogeneous Short Run Dynamics, and Fixed Effects. Solid lines represent long run 
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X1  X2   116
 
  Low/Poor Rights  High/Good Rights 
dY/dK  Low High 
dY/dR  High Low 
 









Table 3:   Univariate Statistics for Key Variables 
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Figure 8: The Worldwide Improvement in Governance.   120
 
  RGDP  LNRGDP GROWTH RIGHTS INVEST EXPORTS  FDI  CPI  LU  LPC  LSC  LHC  TYR 
RGDP    1 . 0 0                    
LNRGDP    0.83    1.00                 
GROWTH    0.09    0.10    1.00               
RIGHTS  -0.42  -0.49  -0.05    1.00            
INVEST    0.95    0.74    0.13  -0.32    1.00           
EXPORTS   0.32   0.26   0.09  -0.05   0.45   1.00               
FDI   0.18   0.17   0.13  -0.10   0.25   0.48   1.00             
CPI  -0.02  -0.00  -0.14    0.01  -0.03  -0.05  -0.05    1.00       
LU  -0.53  -0.75  -0.07   0.47  -0.44 -0.20  -0.19  -0.01  1.00         
LPC   0.51   0.64   0.09  -0.31   0.43   0.10   0.06  -0.02  -0.71  1.00       
LSC   0.52   0.60   0.16  -0.36   0.50   0.26   0.14  -0.02  -0.62  0.39  1.00     
LHC   0.48   0.60   0.04  -0.37   0.42   0.04   0.12   0.02  -0.59  0.39  0.61  1.00   
TYR   0.62   0.76   0.12  -0.43   0.55   0.26   0.23  -0.00  -0.89  0.65  0.80  0.78  1.00 
 




   




























































































































































































































Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Key Governance Variables (Sample includes 162 countries)   123
    
 
 
 POLITY  POL_RIGHT  CIV_LIB  VA  PS  GE  RL  RQ CONCOR  EFS  PROPERTY 
POLITY 1.00                     
POL_RIGHT 0.83  1.00                   
CIV_LIB 0.81  0.92  1.00                 
VA 0.82  0.88  0.91  1.00               
PS 0.36  0.55  0.60  0.71  1.00             
GE 0.48  0.64  0.70  0.84  0.77  1.00           
RL 0.48  0.66  0.71  0.85  0.81  0.97  1.00         
RQ 0.60  0.73  0.79  0.90  0.75  0.94  0.94  1.00       
CONCOR 0.41  0.61  0.66  0.80  0.75  0.95  0.96  0.90 1.00     
EFS 0.57  0.65  0.72  0.82  0.59  0.83  0.83  0.91 0.79  1.00   
PROPERTY 0.50  0.62  0.69  0.78  0.64  0.84  0.86  0.87 0.82  0.87  1.00 
 
Table 6. Correlations for Key Governance Variables (for 162 countries, 2002) 
   124
Figure 1. Canonical Correlations Between Freedom House and World Bank Governance 


































Larger Sample (162 countries) Smaller Sample (66 countries)
 
 
Figure 10: Canonical Correlations Between Freedom House and World Bank Governance Indicators (average canonical correlation for 
a larger sample is 0.92 and for a smaller sample is 0.85.   125
 
Score  Description  Examples of Countries* 
1  Country has a fully competitive electoral process with 
free and fair elections and competitive political parties; 
and opposition has actual power and plays an important 
role  
Barbados, Belize, Bulgaria, Cape 
Verde, Costa Rica, Grenada, Hungary, 
Micronesia, Panama 
2  As ranking 1, however, such factors as political 
corruption, political discrimination against minorities, and 
foreign and military influence on political process may be 
present and weaken the quality of political freedom  
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, 
Croatia, El Salvador, Ghana, Guyana, 
India, Jamaica, Lesotho, Mali, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Namibia, Peru, Philippines, 
Senegal 
3  Less effective enforcement of competitive election 
process than 1 and 2.  
Albania, Argentina, Benin, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Indonesia, Macedonia 
4  Ditto 3, but government may have been selected outside 
the public view by various fraction leaders 
Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Burkina-Faso, Colombia, Djibouti, 
Georgia, Guatemala  
5  No effective electoral process in place, however struggle 
for consensus among a variety of political, ethnic and 
other groups in society  
Bahrain, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Russia 
6  No competitive electoral processes are allowed and a 
country is ruled by one party dictatorships, religious 
hierarchies, military juntas, or autocrats, however, 
leaders may respond to certain popular (cultural, 
religious and ethnic) desire  
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bhutan, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Pakistan, Qatar, Somalia, Tajikistan 
7  Political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent and 
power is controlled by political despots only 
Burma, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Iraq, 
North Korea, Libya, Rwanda, Sudan  
* Examples of countries are drawn from a sample of developing and transition countries based on the Freedom House’s 2003 ratings 
 
Table 7. General Characteristics of Political Rights Ratings    126
 
Score  Description  Examples of Countries* 
1  Country provides full freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, education, and religion and distinguished by 
an established and generally equitable rule of law  
Barbados, Chile, Kiribati, Marshal 
Islands, Slovenia, Uruguay 
2  As ranking 1, however there are deficiencies in the 
implementation of some aspects of civil liberties  
Belize, Benin, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, 
Costa Rica, Guyana, Latvia, South 
Africa 
3  There are some elements of censorship in the press and 
some restrictions with respect to assembly, association, 
and religion  
Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Fiji, Ghana, India, Lesotho, 
Mali, Namibia, Tanzania  
4  The press is strongly censored, free speech and other 
civil liberties are limited and torture may be existent 
Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Colombia, 
Gabon, Indonesia, Kenya, Niger 
5  Little or no free press, legal authorities have apparently 
extensive control over social order, and political prisoners 
are in place 
Algeria, Angola, Chad, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Kazakhstan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan 
6  Severely restricted rights of expression and association, 
few partial civil liberties, such as some religious and 
social freedoms, and some highly restricted private 
business activity 
Belarus, Cameron, China, Haiti, Iran, 
Laos, Liberia, Qatar, Uzbekistan, 
Vietnam, Zimbabwe 
7  Virtually no civil liberties, an overwhelming and justified 
fear of repression based on politics and ethnicity 
Burma, Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, 
Turkmenistan 
* Examples of countries are drawn from a sample of developing and transition countries based on the Freedom House’s 2003 ratings 
 
Table 8. General Characteristics of Civil Liberties Ratings   127
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Pooled 
OLS 




PMGE PMGE PMGE PMGE 
Sample:  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Rights <7  7<Rights<11  Rights>11 
        ARDL  (3,3)  ARDL (3,3)  HQ(3)  ARDL(3,3) 



























    
           
























RLL       -809.38  -195.81  -497.38  -115.03 
ULL       -709.08  -169.31  -446.73  -93.03 
Adj-R
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[0.00]      









[0.26]      
 
Table 9: Relationship between the Rights Measures. FE denotes static fixed effects, FEGLS generalized least squares fixed effects, FDOLS first difference 
OLS estimation, SDOLS second difference OLS estimation, and PMGE pooled mean group estimators. * denotes significance at the 5%, ** at the 10% levels. 
Numbers in round parentheses denote robust standard errors, in square parentheses probability levels.  denotes speed of adjustment to equilibrium under PMGE 
estimation, h-test the test for homogeneity of long run coefficients under PMGE, and RLL and ULL restricted and unrestricted log likelihood values.   128
 
































































StateForm   -0.0002 
(0.0002) 





Asia   -0.36* 
(0.15) 





C&S Africa    -0.24 
(0.15) 





MENA   -0.27 
(0.18) 





CAmer & Carib    -0.04 
(0.14) 





SAmer   -0.04 
(0.12) 





Britain   -0.12 
(0.09) 















% Pop. Prim.  
Compl. 










% Pop. Second.  
Compl. 










% Pop. High Sch.  
Compl. 










Avg Years  
Schooling 








































             
Adj-R
2 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.89  0.92  0.69 0.60  0.27 


































































Table 10: Static Estimation - Log of real GDP: FE denotes static fixed effects, FEGLS generalized least squares fixed effects, FDOLS first difference OLS 
estimation, and SDOLS second difference OLS estimation. * denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and *** at the 10% levels. Numbers in round 
parentheses denote robust standard errors, in square parentheses probability levels.   129
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Figure 11: Elasticity of Output with respect to Composite Rights: upper and lower bounds on Pooled OLS   130
 





















































































































































































































































  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GMM  
Dummies 
Trans.Eq. All Vars 1,2 
Level Eq. All Vars 2 Lev 
Trans.Eq. All Vars 1,2 
Level Eq. All Vars 2 Lev 
Trans.Eq. All RHS Vars 1,2 
Dep Excl 
Level Eq. All RHS Vars 2 Lev 
Deo Excl. 
Trans.Eq. All RHS Vars 1,2 
Dep, RIGHT Excl 
Level Eq. All RHS Vars 2 Lev 
Dep. RIGHT Excl. 
Trans.Eq. All RHS Vars 1,2 
Dep, RIGHT, INV Excl 
Level Eq. All RHS Vars 2 Lev 
Dep. RIGHT, INV Excl. 
Trans.Eq. All RHS Vars 1,2 
RIGHT, INV Excl 
Level Eq. All RHS Vars 2 Lev 
RIGHT, INV Excl. 
Wald (joint)   8.65e+006* [0.000]  2.51e+006* [0.000]  2.77e+006* [0.000] 7.61e+005*  [0.000] 1.34e+006* [0.000]  4.09e+005* [0.000] 
Wald (dummy)   3.52e+004* [0.000]  3919* [0.000]  5421* [0.000] 5.68e+004*  [0.000]  1.89e+004* [0.000]  3371* [0.000] 
Wald (time)  216.6* [0.00]  254.5* [0.00]  207.7* [0.00] 213.3*  [0.00] 271.6*  [0.00] 550.1*  [0.00] 
Sargan  110.3 [1.00]  47.08 [1.00]  55.41 [1.00]  86.65 [1.00]  88.25 [1.00]  71.32 [1.00] 
AR(1) test:   -2.77* [0.006]  -2.78* [0.005]  -2.73* [0.006]  -1.03 [0.30]  -0.88 [0.380]  -1.06 [0.285] 
AR(2) test:   -0.69 [0.488]  -0.39 [0.694]  -0.88 [0.379] -0.63  [0.528] -0.69  [0.488] -1.22  [0.222] 
 
Table 11: GMM Estimation. Estimations reported are 2-step small sample corrections, under either first difference (FD) or orthogonal (Orth.) 
transformations.
132 * denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and *** at the 10% levels. Numbers in round parentheses denote robust standard errors, in 
square parentheses probability levels. 
                                                 
132 The first difference and orthogonal deviations transformations eliminate individual effects from the transformed error term, without at the same time 
introducing all lagged values of the disturbances into the transformed error term. See Arellano and Bover (1995).   131
 


























































Algeria, Australia, Austria, Barbados, 
Bolivia
1, Burundi, Canada, Costa Rica
4, 







16, Namibia, Netherlds., 
New Zeal., Oman
18, Pakis.
19, Pap N Guin
20, 
Rwanda





Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan 
Bolivia
1, Botswana
2, Brunei, Burkina Faso, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde,  
Cen. Afr. Rep., Chad, Chile
3, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica
4, Cote d Ivoire, Cyprus, Dom. Rep., 
Egypt, El Salvador
6, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, 
Gambia







13, Iran, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya
14,  
Korea South, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, 













Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka 
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand
25, 
Togo, Trinidad
26, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE
27, 
UK



































Rumania, Sao Tome & Principe, Sierra Leone, 










Table 12: ADF Results. Superscripts provide cross-references for multiple classifications.   132
 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
























Mean Polright  -0.0033* 
(0.001) 
   -0.0020** 
(0.001) 
  
Mean Civlib    -0.0033** 
(0.001) 
   -0.0022** 
(0.001) 
 
Mean Rights      -0.0017** 
(0.0006) 
   -0.0011* 
(0.0004) 
Adj R
2  0.23  0.19 0.22 0.18 0.17  0.18 
N  30  30 30 29 29  29 
 
Table 13: Linking Growth and Governance in Group IV Countries 
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Country Implied  εy,R 
 Rights 
Index 
ε R min  ε R µ  ε R max 
Argentina R -0.01 3 -0.02 6.2 -0.04 12 
Bahrain R 0.60 8 0.81  10.83  0.97 13 
Bangladesh R -0.21 5 -0.33 7.9 -0.51 12 
Benin  CL  0.04  2  0.10 4.87 0.15  7 
Bhutan  CL  1.27  4  1.66 5.23 2.22  7 
Bolivia  PR  0.24  1  0.74 3.03 1.70  7 
Botswana R 0 3 0  4.57  0 7 
Brunei R -2.66 11 -2.79  11.53  -3.14 13 
Burkina Faso  R -0.18 5 -0.35  9.73  -0.47 13 
Cambodia R -0.29 8 -0.41  12.8  -0.45 14 
Cameroon R -1.10 10 -1.29 11.7 -1.43 13 
Cape Verde  R -0.06 3 -0.16  8.22  -0.26 13 
Cent. African Rep.   CL  0.84  4  1.19  5.68  1.47  7 
Chile R 0.60  3  1.59 7.93 2.40  12 
China R -0.11 11 -0.13  13.03  -0.14 14 
Colombia R 0.12  4  0.17 5.79 0.24  8 
Costa  Rica  CL  0.22  1  0.28 1.29 0.44  2 
Cote  d’  Ivoire  R  3.06  9  3.67 10.8 4.08  12 
Cyprus R  YR    YR    YR   
Dominican Republic  R -0.15 3 -0.24  4.80  -0.35 7 
Egypt R 2.4 8  3.12  10.4  3.6 12 
El Salvador  R -2 5  -2.61  6.53  -4 10 
Fiji R -1.20 4 -1.80  6  -3.30 11 
Finland R 0.20  2  0.31 3.07 0.40  4 
Gabon R -1.33 7 -2.02  10.63  -2.28 12 
Gambia R -0.03 3 -0.07  6.83  -0.13 13 
Ghana R -0.05 5 -0.10 9.7 -0.13 13 
Greece R -0.06 3 -0.09  4.27  -0.24 12 
Guatemala R -0.10 2 -0.18  3.67  -0.30 6 
Guinea  Bissau  PR  0.30  3  0.53 5.25 0.70  7 
Guyana R -0.20 4 -0.35  7  -0.50 10 
Haiti R 0.96 8 1.40  11.67  1.68 14 
Honduras  PR  0.02  5  0.03 6.48 0.07  10 
Hungary R 0.42  3  1.11 7.90 1.68  12 
India R -0.02 4 -0.03  5.53  -0.04 8 
Indonesia R -0.28 7 -0.42  10.40  -0.52 13 
Iran R 0.90 10 1.05  11.63  1.17 13 
Israel R -0.36 3 -0.50  4.17  -0.60 5 
Italy R -0.24 2 -0.34  2.83  -0.48 4 
Jamaica R -0.03 3 -0.04  4.37  -0.05 5 
Japan R -1.86 2 -2.51  2.70  -3.72 4 
Jordan  PR -6.39 3 -3.78  5.07  -7.56 6 
Kenya R 1.17 9 1.39  10.70  1.69 13 
Korea South  R -0.40 4 -0.74  7.43  -1.10 11 
Laos R -2.20 10 -2.87  13.03  -3.08 14 
Lesotho R -0.21 7 -0.28  9.33  -0.36 12 
Madagascar R -0.01 6 -0.02  8.77  -0.02 12 
Malawi R -0.22 5 -0.10  10.90  -0.26 13 
Malaysia  PR  0.08  2  0.15 3.67 0.20  5   134
Mali R 0.08 4 0.21  10.33  0.28 14 
Malta R -0.38 2 -0.60  3.17  -1.14 6 
Mauritania R -0.60 10 -0.61  12.27  -0.70 14 
Mauritius R -0.60 3 -0.80  4  -1.20 6 
Mexico R -0.45 5 -0.65  7.23  -0.72 8 
Morocco R 0 7 0  9.13  0 11 
Mozambique  PR -0.30 3 -0.56  5.57  -0.70 7 
Nicaragua  CL -0.39 3 -0.55  4.20  -0.78 6 
Niger  PR -0.06 3 -0.12  6.10  -0.14 7 
Nigeria R 0.10  5  0.19 9.60 0.28  14 
Oman R -33.77 11 -36.93  12.03  -39.91 13 
Pakistan R -0.06 6 -0.10  9.53  -0.12 12 
Panama R -0.03 3 -0.08  8.30  -0.13 13 
Papua New Guinea  R 0.52  4  0.61 4.70 0.78  6 
Peru R  ∄CV    ∄CV    ∄CV   
Phillipines  R  0 4 0  7.40  0 10 
Portugal  PR -0.17 1 -0.29  1.73  -0.85 5 
Rwanda R -4.29 11 -4.79  12.27  -5.46 14 
Singapore R 0.64  8  0.76 9.47 0.80  10 
South  Africa  PR  0.02  1  0.08 3.87 0.12  6 
Spain R 0.02  2  0.04 4.30 0.11  11 
Sri Lanka  R 0.16  4  0.27 6.77 0.36  9 
Sudan PR  8.20  4  12.36  6.03  14.35  7 
Suriname R -0.15 3 -0.37  7.33  -0.65 13 
Swaziland R 0.96 6 1.68  10.47  1.76 11 
Syria R -0.99 11  -1.18  13.10 -1.26 14 
Thailand R 0.15 5  0.22  7.27  0.36 12 
Togo R 1.70 10  2.02  11.90  2.21 13 
Trinidad R 0.20  2  0.33 3.27 0.60  6 
Tunisia R -2.48 8  -3.29  10.60 -3.41 11 
Turkey R  ∄CV   ∄CV   ∄CV   
UAE R  ∄CV   ∄CV   ∄CV   
UK R  ∄CV    ∄CV   ∄CV   
Uruguay R  -0.04  2  -0.13  6.27  -0.24  12 
Venezuela R -0.06 3  -0.09  4.33 -0.16 8 
Zambia R -0.01 5  -0.02  9.37 -0.02 11 
Zimbabwe R  ∄CV    ∄CV    ∄CV   
 
Table 14: Estimated Elasticities of Output w.r.t. Governance; ε denotes the implied elasticity; Rmin 
denotes the minimum, Rµ the mean, and Rmax the maximum value of the relevant rights index; Cl 
denotes the CIVLIB rights index, POLRIGHT the political rights index, and R the composite rights 
index. ∄CV denotes the absence of a cointegrating relationship. YR that weak exogeneity tests 
suggest that the direction of association is from the economic to the governance dimension.   135
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 










































Adj‐R2  0.0009  0.036  0.049  0.045  0.053  0.051 
N  78  78  78  78  78  78 
 
Table 15: Relationship between elasticity of output with respect to governance to the range of mean 













































































































































































Figure 12: Line of Best Fit From Specification (6) of Table 9. 
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2-4  -0.38 8.91 8.00 0.03 0.04 -0.03  -0.37 0.72 
4-8  -0.09 7.61 8.52 0.02 0.04 -0.06  -0.05 0.46 
8-12  0.08 6.64 7.17 0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.29 
12-14  -1.26 5.92 6.97 0.01 0.05 -0.04  -0.33 0.30 
Classification 2 
2-5  -0.24 8.51 8.40 0.02 0.03 -0.05  -0.23 0.69 
5-8  -0.08 7.38 8.51 0.02 0.04 -0.06  -0.03 0.41 
8-11  0.11 6.60 7.32 0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.35 
11-14  -0.73 6.31 6.68 0.01 0.04 -0.03  -0.17 0.19 
 
Table 16: Summary characteristics of Group V countries, over the range of the Rights Indexes. εY,R 


















































































































































































































































n/a  -0.26923 -0.00773 

























































Table 17: Impact of Changing Rights on Output Growth; * denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 






















































































Figure 16: Estimated Semi-elasticites against mean Rights Change, Mean Output Growth; 
statistically insignificant coefficients zero-restricted 
   140
 
 
Full Sample  (1a) (1b)  (1c) (1d)  (2)  (3) 
Estimator: SFE  DFE  MGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE 
Dep Variable:  lnRGDP  lnRGDP  lnRGDP lnRGDP  lnRGDP  lnRGDP 
Info. Crit.:  n/a  ARDL 
(3,3,3) 




























Avg. Years  
Schooling 




Ln(Exports)          0.25* 
(0.03) 
Ln(FDI)           -0.02* 
(0.01) 
Ln(CPI)          -0.05* 
(0.01) 
            


























RLL       4058.88 3698.63  3002.70 
ULL       4370.25 4121.20  3687.60 
            









Table 18: Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Estimation: PMGE denotes pooled mean group estimators; * denotes significance at the 5%, ** at the 10% 
levels;  denotes the adjustment to the long run equilibrium term; h-test denotes the Hausman test statistic under the null of long-run homogeneity, 
RLL and ULL denotes the restricted an unrestricted log likelihood. 
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Figure 17: Depth of Human Capital and Rights 
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Estimator:  PMGE PMGE PMGE PMGE 
Sample:  Full Sample  Rights <7  7<Rights<11  Rights>11 
Dep. Variable:  RIGHT RIGHT RIGHT RIGHT 









































      

















RLL -1186.38  1982.74  -538.91  -187.89 
ULL -456.52  2358.57  -171.60  -91.30 
 
Table 19: Link between RIGHT and human capital measures. Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Estimation: PMGE denotes pooled mean group 
estimators; * denotes significance at the 5%, ** at the 10% levels;  denotes the adjustment to the long run equilibrium term; h-test denotes the 
Hausman test statistic under the null of long-run homogeneity, RLL and ULL denotes the restricted an unrestricted log likelihood.   143
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Estimator:  PMGE PMGE PMGE PMGE PMGE  PMGE  PMGE PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE PMGE 
Sample:  Full Sample  Rights <7  7<Rights<11  Rights>11  Full Sample  Rights <7  7<Rights<11  Rights>11  Full Sample  Rights <7  7<Rights<11  Rights>11 
Dep Var.  Ln(Exports) Ln(Exports) Ln(Exports) Ln(Exports)  Ln(FDI)  Ln(FDI) Ln(FDI) Ln(FDI) Ln(CPI) Ln(CPI) Ln(CPI)  Ln(CPI) 

























                        








































































RLL 1307.74  398.22  704.49  156.30  3201.07  1059.22  1962.66  597.73  385.64  53.29  158.21  -31.10 
ULL 1392.68  421.22  747.97  169.06  3315.43  1088.72  2033.35  611.95  441.79  75.03  197.75  -25.84 
 
Table 20: Policy and Rights. Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Estimation: PMGE denotes pooled mean group estimators; * denotes significance at the 
5%, ** at the 10% levels;  denotes the adjustment to the long run equilibrium term; h-test denotes the Hausman test statistic under the null of long-
run homogeneity, RLL and ULL denotes the restricted an unrestricted log likelihood. 
 
   144
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Estimator: PMGE PMGE  PMGE  PMGE PMGE  PMGE PMGE  PMGE 
Sample: Full 
Sample 
Full Sample  Rights <7  Rights <7  7<Rights<11  7<Rights<11  Rights>11  Rights>11 
Dep. Variable  RIGHT lnRGDP  RIGHT lnRGDP RIGHT  lnRGDP RIGHT  lnRGDP
Sel. Crit.  HQ(3) HQ(3)  HQ(3) HQ(3) HQ(3) HQ(3)  HQ(3)  HQ(3) 

































                














































RLL -2031.72  3945.19  -576.48  1316.18  -1104.12  2046.58  -325.00  591.31 
ULL -1802.87  4239.72  -528.04  1397.53  -980.68  2203.63  -294.14  638.62 
 
Table 21: Testing for Direction of Causation. Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Estimation: PMGE denotes pooled mean group estimators; * denotes 
significance at the 5%, ** at the 10% levels;  denotes the adjustment to the long run equilibrium term; h-test denotes the Hausman test statistic under 
the null of long-run homogeneity, RLL and ULL denotes the restricted an unrestricted log likelihood. 
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  (1a) (1b) (1c) 
Sample:   Rights<7 7<Rights<11 Rights>11 
Estimator:  PMGE PMGE PMGE 
Dep.  Variable  lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP 










































     






























RLL  1043.98 1149.51  383.23 
ULL  1361.99 1357.51  464.54 
     







Table 22: Taking Fuller Account of Heterogeneity - Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Estimation: PMGE denotes pooled mean group estimators; * 
denotes significance at the 5%, ** at the 10% levels;  denotes the adjustment to the long run equilibrium term; h-test denotes the Hausman test 
statistic under the null of long-run homogeneity, RLL and ULL denotes the restricted an unrestricted log likelihood.   147
 
  (1a) (1b)  (1c) (2a)  (2b)  (2c)  (3a)  (3b)  (3c)  (4a) (4b) (4c) (5a)  (5b)  (5c) 
Estimator:  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE PMGE PMGE PMGE PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE 
Sample:  Rights <7  7<Rights<11  Rights>11  Rights <7  7<Rights<11  Rights>11  Rights <7  7<Rights<11  Rights>11  Rights <7  7<Rights<11  Rights>11 Rights  <7 7<Rights<11  Rights>11 
Dep.  Variable:  Ln(RGDP)  Ln(RGDP)  Ln(RGDP)  Ln(RGDP) Ln(RGDP) Ln(RGDP) Ln(RGDP) Ln(RGDP)  Ln(RGDP)  Ln(RGDP)  Ln(RGDP)  Ln(RGDP)  Ln(RGDP) Ln(RGDP)  Ln(RGDP) 
Info. Crit.:  ARDL(1,2,1,1)  HQ(2) SBC(2)  AIC(2)  ARDL(2,2,3,3,1,1) ARDL(3,0,3,1,1,1)  SBC(2)  ARDL(2,2,2,1,1,1)  AIC(2) AIC(2)  ARDL(2,2,2,1,0,2)  ARDL(1) AIC(1)  AIC(2) AIC(1) 




























































































Avg. Years of  
Schooling 






                
RIGHTS * Avg.  
Years of  
Schooling 






                






        
RIGHTS* 
LN(EXPORT) 






        






    
RIGHTS* 
LN(FDI) 






    














                          









































































































RLL  1349.68  2115.58  507.68  1147.08 1880.28  520.10  1365.93 2139.76  591.44  1262.66  2107.45  563.89  1228.16  1747.20  452.37 
ULL  1435.90  2251.02  676.41  1689.06 2213.38  608.32  1599.37 2362.14  777.19  1513.06  2330.77  666.71  1392.05  2014.91  519.96 
 
Table 23: Exploring Interactions 1: Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Estimation: PMGE denotes pooled mean group estimators; * denotes significance at 
the 5%, ** at the 10% levels;  denotes the adjustment to the long run equilibrium term; h-test denotes the Hausman test statistic under the null of 
long-run homogeneity, RLL and ULL denotes the restricted an unrestricted log likelihood. 
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  (1)  (2a)  (2b) (3a) (3b)  (4a)  (4b) 
Estimator  PMGE PMGE PMGE  PMGE  PMGE PMGE PMGE 
Sample:  Full Sample  Rights<7  Rights<7  7<Rights<11  7<Rights<11  Rights>11  Rights>11 
Dep. Var.:  Growth Growth Growth  Growth  Growth Growth Growth 












































































           
N  45 20 17  34  22 12  8 




























































Table 24: PMGE Examination of non-linearities in economic growth. * denotes significance at the 5%, ** at the 10% levels.  denotes the adjustment to 
the long run equilibrium term; h-test denotes the Hausman test statistic under the null of long-run homogeneity. 
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  (1a) (1b) (1c)  (2a)  (2b)  (2c)  (3a)  (3b)  (3c) 
Estimator  PMGE PMGE PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE 
Sample:  Rights<7 Rights<7 Rights<7  7<Rights<11 7<Rights<11 7<Rights<11  Rights>11  Rights>11  Rights>11 
Dep. Var.:  dRights   Growth  Growth  dRights  Growth Growth  dRights  Growth  Growth 
Info Crit:  AIC(2) HQ(3) SBC(3)  SBC(3)  AIC(3)  AIC(3)  HQ(3)  HQ(2)  HQ(2) 


















Growth  0.145 
(0.954) 
   -0.667 
(0.536) 
   -0.474 
(0.621) 
  
dRights   -0.002* 
(0.001) 
   0.001 
(0.001) 
   -0.006* 
(0.002) 
 
dRights(-1)     -0.002* 
(0.001) 
   0.001 
(0.001) 
   -0.004* 
(0.002) 
                 























































Table 25: Testing for Direction of Causation. * denotes significance at the 5%, ** at the 10% levels.  denotes the adjustment to the long run 
equilibrium term; h-test denotes the Hausman test statistic under the null of long-run homogeneity. 
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  (1a) (1b) (1c)  (1d)  (1e)  (2a)  (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (3a)  (3b)  (3c)  (3d)  (3e) 
Estimator  PMGE PMGE PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE PMGE PMGE PMGE PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE  PMGE 
Sample:  Rights<7  Rights<7  Rights<7  Rights<7  Rights<7  7<Rights<11  7<Rights<11 7<Rights<11 7<Rights<11 7<Rights<11 Rights>11  Rights>11 Rights>11  Rights>11  Rights>11 
Dep.  Var.:  Growth Growth Growth  Growth  Growth Growth Growth  Growth  Growth Growth Growth  Growth Growth  Growth  Growth 




























































































      -0.004* 
(0.002) 
     -0.024* 
(0.010) 
      




      -0.001 
(0.001) 
     -0.034* 
(0.011) 
   
RIGHTS* 
Avg.  




      0.000 
(0.001) 
     0.029 
(0.012) 
   
Ln(EXPORT)     0.021* 
(0.008) 
       0.000 
(0.004) 





   -0.008* 
(0.004) 
       -0.001 
(0.002) 
      -0.013 
(0.012) 
  
Ln(FDI)      0.104* 
(0.033) 
      0.020 
(0.025) 





    -0.012 
(0.031) 
      -0.002 
(0.023) 
      0.297*** 
(0.168) 
 
Ln(CPI)        -0.009* 
(0.003) 
       -0.016* 
(0.002) 




      0.003 
(0.002) 
       -0.001 
(0.002) 
      -0.025 
(0.017) 
                         
                         
                         
N  19 19 18  18  16  34  28 33 33 28 12  10  12  12  9 

















































































































Table 26: PMGE Examination of non-linearities in economic growth: interaction effects. * denotes significance at the 5%, ** at the 10% levels.  
denotes the adjustment to the long run equilibrium term; h-test denotes the Hausman test statistic under the null of long-run homogeneity. 
 
 
 
 